Opinion: The Rikers federal monitor’s failures and the flawed Nunez consent decree

The ongoing crisis at Rikers Island has been met with a barrage of reforms, oversight, and federal mandates – chief among them, the Nunez Consent Decree. Yet, despite a decade of intervention, the problems persist. The courts, Legal Aid Society, and the federal monitor – institutions tasked with charting a path toward reform – have demonstrated a glaring inability to address the core issues. What has gone wrong? Why has the Nunez Consent Decree failed to replicate the success of earlier interventions like the 1996 CPSU Consent Decree?

It’s time to face some hard truths. The Nunez Consent Decree is a sprawling, unfocused document that seeks to solve every problem across Rikers Island simultaneously. While noble in its ambitions, it lacks the precision, accuracy, and vision necessary to achieve meaningful, measurable change. Contrast this with the CPSU Consent Decree of the 1990s, which dealt specifically with abuses within the Central Punitive Segregation Unit and successfully resolved these issues 18 months ahead of schedule.

Learning from the past

The CPSU Consent Decree was not without challenges, but it was effective because it set clear, attainable goals. Overseen by then-federal monitor Steve Martin, it required the city Department of Correction to implement targeted solutions. Martin, who brought both expertise and accountability to the table, worked in partnership with DOC leadership, fostering a culture of cooperation rather than confrontation. Fast-forward to today, and Steve Martin once again occupies the role of federal monitor, this time under the Nunez Consent Decree. However, his approach has radically shifted. He has lost his hands-on approach and the precision and focus that characterized his earlier success. The result? Over a decade of stagnation, with no resolution in sight. The contrast between the CPSU and Nunez decrees is striking. The CPSU decree addressed specific abuses in one facility. The Nunez decree, by comparison, casts a wide net, attempting to tackle systemic issues such as use of force, staffing shortages, and detainee safety – all at once. While these are undeniably important concerns, the lack of focus has diluted the decree’s effectiveness.

The courts must pivot

Judge Laura Swain, who oversees the Nunez Consent Decree, must consider adopting the principles used by her predecessors, Judges Pierre Leval and Morris Lasker. These judges emphasized clear objectives, accountability, and practical timelines. Instead of overwhelming the DOC with an unwieldy checklist, they worked to ensure reforms were both realistic and sustainable.

For the Nunez Consent Decree to succeed, it must be narrowed down to its most urgent priorities. The courts should:

• Define clear objectives: Break the decree into manageable components, each with measurable outcomes.
• Foster collaboration: Encourage a partnership between the federal monitor and DOC leadership, rather than perpetuating an adversarial dynamic.
• Ensure accountability: Like her predecessors maybe appoint additional monitors and advisors with institutional knowledge of Rikers Island, ensuring that oversight is both credible and effective.
• Prioritize immediate concerns: Focus first on the most pressing issues, such as curbing excessive use of force and improving detainee safety.

Overreach and misguided goals

The Nunez Consent Decree suffers from overreach. By attempting to address systemic issues without a clear roadmap, it has become a bureaucratic quagmire. Many of the so-called “problems” identified in the decree are poorly defined, lacking precision and a clear understanding of what success looks like. For example, vague mandates around staff training and facility improvements fail to specify actionable steps or realistic timelines.

Moreover, the decree's expansive scope has created a culture of perpetual noncompliance, where achieving full resolution seems impossible. This stands in stark contrast to the CPSU Consent Decree, which identified specific violations and required targeted remedies.

Role of Legal Aid

The Legal Aid Society, a key player in the litigation leading to the Nunez Consent Decree, must also shoulder some responsibility. While their advocacy has shone a critical light on abuses, their insistence on broad, sweeping reforms has contributed to the decree's unmanageable scope. Advocacy without practicality does little to improve conditions for detainees or staff. Legal Aid must rethink its approach, emphasizing achievable goals over idealistic aspirations.

A call for change

Rikers Island cannot wait another decade for effective reform. The federal monitor, the courts and advocacy groups must recalibrate their strategies. The lessons of the CPSU Consent Decree are clear: focus, collaboration and accountability are the keys to success. The Nunez Consent Decree, in its current form, is a case study in failure. It attempts to do too much, too broadly, with too little precision. The time has come for Swain and her colleagues to chart a new course – one grounded in the practical realities of correctional reform. Only then can we hope to achieve the justice and accountability that Rikers Island so desperately needs.